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ABSTRACT
Looking back to the The Arts and Humanities Research Board’s (AHRB)
September 2003 Response to Consultation entitled The Research
Assessment Exercise (RAE) and Research in the Creative and Performing
Arts and looking forward to the 2008 RAE audit itself, this essay is
concerned with some aspects of the contentious discourse which surrounds
research by creative artwork, specifically, in the following sections: i) the
fundaments of the antagonism between those who believe fine art practice
to be research in itself and those audit managers who do not; ii) the
potentially perilous status for fine art research within the institution as a
result of that antagonism; and iii) the objectifying pressure of imputed
institutional need prescribed by audit managers which sustains the
antagonism.
In treating the institutional discourse which surrounds research by
creative visual artwork as essentially bound up with the construction and
management of knowledge, select theorists and commentators are brought
to bear. Section i) references Euan McArthur’s recent critical response to
the AHRB’s Consultation paper, and also the work of Michael Crozier on
bureaucracies; section ii) imports terminology used by American
academic Michael Barkun to describe the status of knowledge held by
2marginal groupings, and, by way of illustration of Barkun’s ideas, Stephen
Farthing’s estimation of how art is made; and section iii) applies
American philosopher Barry Allen’s concept of a disabling
counterproductivity brought about by the excessive knowledge and
information generated by a disciplinary power which manages imputed
need. Because of the running inquiry into the construction and
management of knowledge, all three sections are informed by Michel
Foucault’s thinking on power/knowledge dynamics. A brief Conclusion
takes stock of the Foucauldian strategy of analysis and reflects on the
essay itself as an example of instrumental research authorised by the
machinations of an  auditing bureau.
I. PRELIMINARY ANTAGONISMS
The AHRB September 2003 Response to Consultation usefully heightened
the debate in UK schools of art over the validity of research by creative
artwork. For most Fine Art academics the paper will have by now formally
justified the lingering fear that creative visual artwork cannot in itself be
automatically seen as valid research within the terms of judgement
exercised by both the AHRB and the RAE. The Response to Consultation
has made this standpoint very clear: ‘We do not believe that a creative,
performance, or practice-led output should be allowed to stand on its own
as a record of research activity’.1
In which case, of course, supplementary non- creative,
performance or practice-led materials have to accompany the artwork if it
3is to have any credibility within the remit of the auditing and funding
bodies in question. It is, primarily, this demand for auxiliary material that
so rankles defenders of research by creative visual artwork; a demand
which, again, is made in no uncertain terms in the AHRB’s document:
‘We believe that any research output submitted to the RAE should have
associated with it a record or “route map” of the research process’.2
Euan McArthur in his antagonistic response to the AHRB’s paper
(JVAP 3:1 2004) takes issue with this requirement, declaring that creative
works can indeed be seen to be credible outputs of research in their own
right for ‘that is precisely what they are if it is true (and the [AHRB] paper
says it is) that new knowledge (however defined) can be embedded or
incorporated in creative works’.3 Underlying the position that upholds the
fundamental primacy of the artwork in an assessment of possible research
worth (what I call hereafter the ‘in-itself’ position) is the rather a priori
belief (conspicuous as a sub-text in McArthur’s rejoinder) that the object
of art does indeed contain a revelatory form of knowledge, independent of
any auxiliary critical text or accompanying explication. In this view,
clearly, the work of art is a non-instrumental contribution to new
knowledge which by definition must resist the type of secondary,
instrumental rationalisation called for by the AHRB and RAE.
The consultation paper affirms that evidence of a credible research
process, in the estimation of the AHRB, might very well be found in
creative works, embedded or incorporated, but there is no explicit
corollary statement, however paradoxical it may seem, as to the possibility
of such evidence being regarded as new knowledge or bona fide research
(if they are the same thing) without the support of attendant explicatory
4items. In any case, realistically, this issue of the research status of that
which is or is not embedded or incorporated in the work is, for better or for
worse, a moot point, as the AHRB publication tentatively but deliberately
implies.
Whilst McArthur may be right in his reading of the document (and
assuming that the AHRB is right in making the statement [if indeed they
did] that new knowledge could potentially be embedded and incorporated
in the work itself), the current (and future) fact of the matter is that the
burden of proof is still incumbent on the researcher by creative artwork
irrespective of what new knowledge is believed or even known (by either
the artist or the auditor) to be self-evidently present in the creative work.
In other words, even if a vigorous defence of the primacy of the art object
in the context of audit convinces the AHRB and RAE of the intrinsic
research content of the work of art, these executive bodies will still ask for
parallel critical accounts of that content.
The intense frustration felt by defenders of visual artwork as
research in itself, those who see parallel summative pro-forma
commentaries as time-consuming and redundant, demonstrates that the
fundamental antagonism between non-instrumental and instrumental in
this context is but one specific institutional manifestation of a profound
and deep-seated antipathy between the Creative and the Bureaucratic,
between notional free-will and the supposed shackles of centralised
administration; a perennial struggle summarised by French academic
Michael Crozier in his prescient text The Bureaucratic Phenomenon
(Chicago 1964):
5On the one hand, most authors consider the bureaucratic organization to be the
embodiment of rationality in the modern world, and, as such, to be intrinsically
superior to all other possible forms of organization. On the other hand, many
authors – often the same ones – consider it a sort of Leviathan, preparing the
enslavement of the human race. Optimism and pessimism are mixed in various
ways. Whatever their proportions, there is always a double belief in the
superiority of bureaucratic rationality – in the domain of efficiency, and in its
threatening implications in the domain of human values.4
At the heart of the in-itself position is a charged emotional resistance to
the perceived meta-problem of the bureaucratisation of life no less, felt
most acutely when creativity, of all things, appears under threat from the
inexorable momentum of managerialism. That said, it is important to note
that the in-itself researcher does not propound indiscriminate antagonism
towards the AHRB/RAE principle of peer review, nor does he suggest that
audit should be dispensed with, but he does retain strong reservation about
the relevance to his subject discipline of a quintessentially managerial
system of audit which cannot configure itself to attempt a summative
assessment of the value of practice in-itself..5
But the intrinsic obstinacy and pessimism which rightly or wrongly
inform this resistance to managerial bureaucracy are dangerously close to
being read as partly constituting, by those who share the opinion of the
AHRB on this matter, a pre-modern, nostalgic attitude of non-reason, one
which can be easily discounted by any rational establishment. In addition,
fatally, the characteristics inherent in this inflexible attitude are understood
by the governing bureau to be ever-present in the very works of art which
are put forward to audit as examples of research in-itself; as if to say that
fine art is customarily produced by a suspension of rationality as a
manifest liberation of the human spirit. This struggle inevitably diverges
towards its extreme components, vacating any common ground which
6might have supported dialectical progression. The putative rational
efficiency of the auditing bureaucrat is irresistibly defined in
contradistinction to the putative pre-modern non-reason of the in-itself
creative practitioner, and, in an identically simplistic way, vice-versa.6
In practice this contradistinction precipitates what Crozier
convincingly described as a ‘displacement of goals’:
The discipline necessary for obtaining the standardized behaviour required in a
bureaucratic organisation will bring about a displacement of goals. Bureaucrats
will show “ritualist” attitudes that will make them unable to adjust adequately to
the problems they must solve. This will entail the development of a strong esprit
de corps at a group level and create a gap between the public and the
bureaucracy.7
The ritualistic character of a national audit must demonstrate a will to
standardise, and thus, notwithstanding compelling argumentation from the
in-itself camp, the problem of research by creative artwork is formally
solved, not by an ongoing substantive engagement with the intellectual
ins-and-outs of the philosophical viability of creative artwork as research
in-itself, but by an ongoing clarification of the bureau’s standards -
through policy statements, consultations and responses to consultations,
each layer putting blunt pressure on those ‘pre-rational’ groups who resist
the enslavement of their transcendent agenda.8
This enduring model of struggle can be illuminated by Foucault’s
thinking on the way in which authority of all kinds is dependent on a
conscious or unconscious complicity on the part of the subject of the
authority’s attention. Considered against that model, the in-itself position
adopts and is given the role of focus of the bureaucratic authority’s
attention within the administration of the standardising RAE. But, with
7guidance from Foucault, rather than effect a productive dialectical
antagonism, the in-itself position can be seen to paradoxically inform,
authorise and sustain the domineering criteria of the audit.
Crucial to this possibility is Foucault’s conception of power as
fluid and not statically situated in the hands of any one authoritative agent
or any one concomitant antagonist; ‘power is employed through a net-like
organization’ it is ‘something that circulates’.9 In this way, rather than the
enterprise of the RAE audit being embattled by reactionary polemic, it is
empowered: for the antagonistic position, using Foucault’s model, cannot
be external to the defining net-like arrangement of for-and-against power
dynamics which it helps to define. In playing to an argument of counter-
veracity, the in-itself position stays well within the power configurations
of the mutual antagonism: it does not convey anterior insights and
ultimately plays a foundational role in sustaining its bureaucratic other.
This fact has much to do with the requirement of the antagonistic
polemicist to always foreground the assumed mistakes of his discursive
enemy. In describing polemic action in order to explain his dislike for the
strategy, Foucault stated in interview:
The polemicist proceeds encased in privileges that he possesses in advance and
will never agree to question. The person he confronts is not a partner in the
search for truth, but an adversary, an enemy who is wrong, who is harmful and
whose very existence constitutes a threat. His final objective will be, not to come
as close as possible to a difficult truth, but to bring about the triumph of the just
cause he has been manifestly upholding from the beginning.10
In this discussion, the antagonistic position will hold little hope for the
auditing interlocutor becoming a partner in a search for the truth of the
intrinsic value and wider worth of research by creative artwork; the auditor
8is instead always an agent of error who practises harmful assessments of
the cause represented by his inextricably linked argumentative opposite.
Joseph Rouse develops Foucault’s idea of the matrix-like
generation and perpetuation of predictable power/knowledge positions,
and emphasises the point that :
Power is not possessed by a dominant agent, nor located in that agent’s relations
to those dominated, but is instead distributed through complex social networks.
The actions of the peripheral agents in these networks are often what establish or
enforce the connections between what a dominant agent does and the fulfillment
or frustration of a subordinate agent’s desires.11
With this elaboration, Rouse might very well have described the central
authority of the standardising audit bureau, with its network of peripheral
agents who oversee the application of criteria locally, contributing their
part to the cyclical antagonistic equation.12 But, once again, the in-itself
practitioners can themselves be seen to be peripheral agents, playing their
own role in a system of, in their view, overall frustration, for, as Rouse
goes on, ‘even in situations in which we might characteristically describe
one person as having or exercising power over another, that power
depends upon other persons or groups acting in concert with what the first
person does.’13 As we will see, to act in a predictably oppositional manner
to the networked authority of audit brings about a marginal position for the
dissenters whilst maintaining the familiar hierarchy which gave rise to the
antagonism. This connectedness of the factions of antagonism (central
elements, local ones and the antagonees) can, then, restrict critique
generated by any one faction to the limits of the net which encloses the
respective power/knowledge dynamic.
9As a crucial part of his history of sexuality, Foucault proposed his
own critique as one which does in fact obtain an external critical outlook;
one which can perceive the shifting orientations of the surrounding
discourse which contains and controls the contested truths. This type of
supra-critique, intimated by Rouse’s summary, can help to better
understand the nature and consequence of the antagonism between the in-
itself practitioner and the standardising auditor without necessarily
meeting head-on the self-fulfilling and self-perpetuating problematics of
the value judgement dilemma over the credibility of research by creative
artwork.
Clarifying this particular strategy of criticism in The History of
Sexuality Volume I, Foucault wrote:
The object, in short, is to define the regime of power-knowledge-pleasure that
sustains the discourse on human sexuality in our part of the world. The central
issue, then (at least in the first instance), is not to determine whether one says
yes or no to sex, whether one formulates prohibitions or permissions, whether
one asserts its importance or denies its effects, or whether one refines the words
one uses to designate it; but to account for the fact that it is spoken about, to
discover who does the speaking, the positions and viewpoints from which they
speak, the institutions which prompt people to speak about it and which store
and distribute the things that are said. What is at issue, briefly, is the overall
“discursive fact,” the way in which sex “is put into discourse.”14
The contestatory nature of the debate which accompanies standardising
statements such as the AHRB’s Response to Consultation is usefully seen
in this way, for it allows the discursive fact of the antagonism to become a
discreet focus. As exemplification of this discreteness, thus far it will have
been noted that I offer no unequivocal value judgement apropos the
validity of embedded content as research in itself, nor do I seek to in what
follows. Rather, the Foucauldian critical perspective is explored for its
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particular yield. It might be argued, however, that this Foucauldian
discreteness is, in the last analysis, an evasive strategy, and one which has
the look of a quintessentially bureaucratic manoeuvre – for it resists
becoming entangled in the internal principles of the specific debate which
sits within the discourse to be reflected upon.
Richard Rorty has been most critical of this equivocal aspect of
Foucault’s strategy of critique and has pinpointed, as well as its
widespread influence, the double-bind which it tends towards:
When asked for a utopian sketch of our country’s future, the new leftists reply
along the lines of one of Foucault’s most fatuous remarks. When asked why he
never sketched a utopia, Foucault said, ‘I think that to imagine another system is
to extend our participation in the present system.15
Although Rorty is gracious enough to go on to say that ‘Foucault [was] a
lot better than these unfortunate remarks would suggest’,16 he identifies the
difficulty inherent in Foucault’s being critical of an antagonistic power
dynamic from the outside, for to contribute criticism in the manner of
McArthur, under the net as it were, extends the present system, so the
Foucauldian ought simply to desist. Nonetheless, based on accumulated
anterior insights gathered with guidance from Foucault, and cautioned by
Rorty and McArthur, something unequivocal might be ventured about the
machinations and effects of audit – without, perhaps, championing
existing antagonistic standpoints, or engaging explicitly with the
philosophical difficulties which relate to the in-itself argumentation and
that of the auditors.
Suffice it to say for now, the fundamentally divisive nature of the
disagreement outlined above contextualises what follows, and compels the
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critique temporarily outwards, for concentration on the enmity of truths
alone does, as Foucault’s practice implies, shield many important points
about the ways in which the power/knowledge movements of the discourse
in question shape the nature of the disputing factions and describe, in
advance, the consequences for both.
In the next section, with reference to the work of American
political scientist Michael Barkun, I elaborate on a perilously antagonistic
scenario which results from the persistent impasse between the in-itself
and instrumental positions whereby participants in, and apologists for,
research by creative visual artwork will inevitably and unwittingly bestow
upon themselves (with the tacit support of some research administrators no
doubt) the strategically disadvantageous role of guardians of stigmatised
knowledge.
II. MARGINALISATION AND STIGMATISATION
The type of antagonism between the in-itself camp and the auditors’
bureau is, as seen from a Foucauldian stance, not a simple or stable stand-
off; it is a volatile condition of power dynamics. The supra-critique which
examines these dynamics illuminates the ways in which the position
spoken to by Euan McArthur is inevitably steered by the power/knowledge
machinations which arise from antagonistic arguments of truth and
counter-truth: steered, in this case, to a site occupied by stigmatised
knowledge claims.
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Michael Barkun, writing about various paranoia and conspiracy
theories in contemporary USA, explains his term stigmatised knowledge to
mean, in short, ‘claims to truth that the claimants regard as verifiable
despite the marginalization of those claims by the institutions that
conventionally distinguish between knowledge and error’.17 In A Culture
of Conspiracy (2003), he sets out five strands of stigmatised knowledge:
forgotten, ignored, rejected, suppressed and superseded. Anterior insights
into the struggle between the creative, in-itself researcher and the
bureaucratic auditor can be gained from the particular applicability of
‘ignored’, ‘rejected’, ‘suppressed’ and ‘superseded’.18 Important to
Barkun’s analysis is the dual nature of these five strands. They are types of
knowledge, yes, but also states of mind for those who uphold those types
of knowledge.
Barkun offers the phrase stigmatised knowledge as an
augmentation of two overlapping terms in his field. The first, ‘rejected
knowledge’, was coined in the 1970s by historian of European occultism
James Webb to position occultism against the findings of standard
authoritative institutions.19 Barkun makes note that Webb’s term (in line
with Foucault’s analytical strategy) ‘refers less to the possible falsity of
knowledge claims (though they may indeed be false) than to the
relationship between certain claims and the so-called establishment’.20
Upholders of knowledge (be it true or false) which has been rejected by
the powers that be, quickly form themselves, Webb concluded, into sub-
cultures and underground movements (with a characteristic esprit de corps
no doubt) so that support for the rejected beliefs might be collectively
engendered. The second term, ‘cultic milieu’ was introduced also in the
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1970s by British sociologist Colin Campbell to describe in a more general
way the domain which accommodates and supports the rejected
knowledge of not just the occult, but all so-called deviant belief systems
and practices.21
Setting to one side as planned the veracity of any specific claims to
knowledge, Barkun’s five point developed analysis of Webb’s and
Campbell’s foundational ideas bears scrutiny here, for, like certain other
marginal, alternative or reactionary belief systems, the ontological
assertion that the creative artwork itself is research in itself customarily
carries with it the concomitant series of antagonistic states of mind: that
this surely true claim for the profound work of art is (i) customarily
‘ignored’ (not taken as a given by, in this case, governmental auditors,
therefore, to quote Barkun, ‘upheld only in marginal groups’) (ii) often
‘rejected’ (regarded as ‘utterly false from the outset’ by instrumental
researchers and auditors) and (iii) most sinisterly, ‘suppressed’ (known to
be probably true by auditors but suppressed ‘because the institutions fear
the consequences of public knowledge, or have some selfish motive for
hiding the truth’). Ultimately, if these three beliefs prove to be true, or at
least if the series comes into effect, the knowledge and wisdom which
underpins the ontological assertion of the in-itself position is likely to be
(iv) ‘superseded’ (wisdom which was ‘once authoritatively recognised as
knowledge’ will be lost, to the institution of art in this case, by way of the
pressures of ignorance, rejection and suppression, to be ultimately
‘regarded as false or less valid than other claims’). 22
These instances of anxious belief are inextricably linked to the
essentialist in-itself defence and are made manifest in bureaucratically
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rationalised organisations sometimes in a paranoid fashion, no doubt, and
sometimes with good reason. Whatever the case, the display of these
anxieties and the exercising of the forces of power/knowledge which cause
them, lead to a clear marginalisation of the defenders of the in-itself
retaliatory discourse. And from a marginal position within the institution it
is but a small step to outright stigmatisation for that method of knowing
proposed and practised by the marginal group.
Progression from centre to margin to stigmatised status involves
not just the designed oppression by auditors who choose between
knowledge and error but also the dogged resistance of the defenders of that
which is being marginalised – Foucault’s idea of a symbiotically sustained
power play, one extreme baiting and begetting the other. This vicious
catalysing of designed oppression (authority-stigmatisation) and dogged
antagonism (auto-stigmatisation) produces a spiralling negative effect on
certain forms of knowledge and the sub-cultures which support these
forms.
As Barkun explains, there exists a spiralling effect on the status of
marginal knowledge towards stigmatisation because of the way in which
the ‘suppressed knowledge category tends to absorb the others’.23 As soon
as normative authority is seen by marginal groupings to be perniciously
standardising knowledge and behaviour, claims of suppression arise and,
in due course (this is where Barkun specialises) conspiracy is declared.
Because believers [in marginal knowledge] assume that when their own ideas
about knowledge conflict with some orthodoxy, the forces of orthodoxy will
necessarily try to perpetuate error out of self-interest or some other evil motive.
The consequence is to attribute all forms of knowledge stigmatization to the
machinations of a conspiracy. Conspiracy theories therefore function both as
part of suppressed knowledge and as a basis for stigmatisation.24
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Barkun makes clear in this analysis that the propensity to believe in a
conspiracy is fuelled by the recognition of the stigmatised status which
attaches to the knowledge believed to be true by the conspiracy theorist.
To believe in a conspiracy theory on top of a belief in stigmatised
knowledge necessarily compounds the issue and reinforces the marginal
position of the believer. The ‘error’ in this model is defined and
pronounced by the authority of orthodoxy and attributed to the marginal
group – for who could take stigmatised knowledge groups seriously if they
appear to trade irrational stories of complex conspiracies by way of
rationalising their stigmatised status? From the perspective of the
marginal-to-stigmatised group, the error lies with the authority and its
network of collaborators for erroneously suppressing the truth of the
marginal position.
With regard to the RAE and the AHRB’s Response to
Consultation, it is not suggested here that error is strategically defined and
attributed (or internally countenanced) by these organisations. That said, a
similar in kind power/knowledge effect to that meted out to Barkun’s
marginalised group results from the auditing authority’s avoidance of
detailed engagement with the truth potential of the in-itself argumentation.
Put another way, the rendering of that argumentation moot, as detailed in
the previous section, constitutes perpetuation of the kind detailed by
Barkun, if, that is, those who uphold the marginal in-itself position believe
that the audit conspiratorially suppresses or deliberately subordinates the
possibility of the truth of their marginalised knowledge for the sake of a
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goal of self-interest – in this case, the disciplined ease of standardised
audit. Barkun continues:
At one level, conspiracy theories are an example of suppressed knowledge,
because those who believe in conspiracy theories are convinced that only they
know the true manner in which power is held and decisions made. The
conspiracy is believed to have used its power to keep the rest of the populace in
ignorance. At another level, conspiracy theories explain why all forms of
stigmatized knowledge claims have been marginalized – allegedly the
conspiracy has utilized its power to keep the truth from being known.25
Whilst nobody within the in-itself camp would readily accept the tag of
conspiracy theorist, Barkun’s application of what is a Foucauldian take on
the mutually formative outcomes of opposing opinions firstly reinforces
the described fundaments of the pivotal antagonism and, secondly, reveals
something practical of the power dynamics which proceed from that
antagonism.
In practice the tactics of power available to networked local agents
of institutional audit include, as Barkun suggests, to ignore and to reject
the knowledge claims of the in-itself grouping and, also, to propose other
criteria of knowledge and evaluation which might supersede the
equivalents held true by in-itself proponents. To operate in these ways,
clearly, a net-like authority must have a vested interest in the unfettered
efficiency of bureaucratic momentum, even at the expense of
marginalising existing and potential research of the kind which cannot be
easily reckoned. The momentum of bureaucratic rationalisation is
inversely proportional to the certainty with which the in-itself
belief/knowledge is held – and, according to Barkun’s dynamic model,
marginalisation is perverse proof of the veracity of the knowledge
protected by marginalised and stigmatised groups.
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The connections between Barkun’s discursive context and the
debates surrounding research by creative visual artwork can easily be
stretched too far. After all, his chief concern is the relation between
stigmatised knowledge claims and conspiracy theories which relate to,
amongst other things, ufology, the Illuminati and the lost world of
Atlantis. But what lingers from the comparison is this critical and
instructive connection between the attitudes of the defensive fine art
researcher and those of Barkun’s subculture conspiracy theorist: both
faithfully believe in the verifiability of their practice despite and because
of spiralling marginalisation toward stigmatisation.
Take as illustration of Barkun’s Foucauldian assessment of this
spiralling cooperation of power, Stephen Farthing’s opinion on art making.
Whilst not uncomplicatedly representative of the opinions of the in-itself
camp, Farthing’s ideas do reveal an extreme version of the in-itself
contention anathema to standardising auditors. His position also
demonstrates aspects of Barkun’s Foucauldian thinking, for Farthing
describes a belief which, in the manner of auto-stigmatisation, comprises
both a faithful and strident knowledge of its own methods and a defensive
anticipation of its other, namely, the kind of normative criticism which
would marginalise such a passionately committed creativity. Farthing
pronounced:
When I paint I simply decide one day to start work, rather as if I were setting out
to create a meal. I then work with the resources I have immediately to hand,
shaping each image while working directly onto the canvas. There is (some)
research, but no formal design process; the end result should appear fresh and
hand-made. This approach relies on putting the whole image down quickly and
then, over a period of time (usually months rather than days or years),
reorganising and refining its first form by adding a bit here and removing a bit
there. If the piece is a success it turns into something that appears to me new and
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unfamiliar. This is my experience, but I have no reason to assume that it is very
different for other artists.26
Farthing has, then, subtly assimilated a knowledge of the institutional
criticisms of ‘pre-rational’ fine art making in the drafting of his own
modus operandi; of course visual art is based on a degree of research, he
says, and even though that research is subordinate to the artist’s (painter’s)
creative engagement with the material of his art, the success of the work
can nonetheless be measured by gauging newness (new knowledge?) and
unfamiliarity. So, whilst at the same time as upholding inspirationally
driven non-instrumental approaches to creative artwork, as opposed to
production by premeditated instrumental research and design, Farthing
lays claim to a means by which an artwork could be rationally judged, and
to further waylay any auditing bureaucrats’ criticisms of isolated
subjectivism, he aligns his practice, as Barkun predicted via Webb, to that
of others he perceives to be potentially in his marginalised group, for how
could all members be misguided?
Knowing full well that the AHRB and RAE and their agents have
no truck with the stand-alone qualities of work produced by creative
meandering, Farthing flirts with the power/knowledge frisson which stems
from protecting that which is, institutionally at least, fast becoming
stigmatised. In the manner of Barkun’s conspiracy theorist, Farthing takes
strange comfort from the fact that his view is regarded by today’s
instrumental art operators as anachronistic and unaccountably subjective -
his claim to truth is marginalised by the institutions that conventionally
distinguish between knowledge and error, and that marginalisation partly
determines the delineation of his claim.27 Of course, introducing caution
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by way of Barkun’s model, Farthing may very well be right in his
identification of how good art should be made, but one thing is certain,
despite his anticipation of his own reflective assessment of the completed
artwork, his creative output does not lend itself well to rational audit.
Barkun’s terminology is useful, then, in establishing an exterior
perspective on the arrangements and consequences of Foucault’s
power/knowledge dynamics and Crozier’s displacement of goals;
especially the way in which auto-stigmatisation plays itself out in
contradistinction to the viewpoint of the agent of authority, thus sustaining
the mutual connectedness of the fundamental antagonism.
The next section is concerned with some specific strategies of
ignorance, rejection, suppression and supersession which contribute in a
serious way to the authority-stigmatisation of the in-itself faction, and
how, under the thrall of authority-stigmatisation, the upholder of the in-
itself position can find herself arranged and objectified by the
administrative regime.
III.  OBJECTIFICATION THROUGH IMPUTED NEED
The above sections combine to show, firstly, the divisive nature of the
antagonism between the in-itself position and the auditing bureau, and,
secondly, how that divisiveness can lead within a bureaucratic system to
certain symbiotic forms of auto- and authority-stigmatisation. Thus far,
then, something of the discursive fact of the in-itself case has been
revealed, and to continue with that tactic of critique this section asks: how
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does the authority and its agencies see that certain knowledges are ignored,
rejected, suppressed and superseded, and, once pressure from authorities
has placed him/it (artist/topic) there, how is the subject of the in-itself
camp confined to a stigmatised position?
It is the case that certain institutionalised antagonists are wont to be
forever just that, whatever the argument at issue; siding with the perceived
authority seems to them always untenable, perhaps because it is held, in
this context, that the positivist historical proviso of fine art making is for it
to be a practice antagonistic to established internal forms and external
systems.28 It is also the case, however, that the networked outposts of the
authority’s agents impute a powerfully coercive sense of need on those
occupying stigmatised territory less resolutely antagonistic to the demands
of authority. To do this the audit offices must exercise a pervasive form of
bureaucratic control and, as an inevitable consequence of the way in which
this is done, the central RAE industry corroborates Foucault’s observation
that ‘the exercise of power creates and causes to emerge new objects of
knowledge and accumulates new bodies of information’.29 These new
bodies of data, which contain at their core the ongoing documentary
clarification of the standardising criteria, are transmitted throughout our
institutions of art in order to establish a need on the part of the individual
researcher by creative artwork – a need to act irrationally, by the terms of
Farthing’s and McArthur’s practice, in order to react rationally to their
studio practice so that, in turn, administratively effective auxiliary
materials might be appositely packaged for instrumental service: there
ensues, ultimately, a shift of the expertise of the creative practice of art
making to the uncreative practice of making art into institutional expertise.
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The researcher’s accumulation of new objects of knowledge and
new information at the behest of administrative bureaucracy coupled with
the bureau’s accumulation of information and tabulated rationalisation as
part of the responsive audit, shows us, as Foucault asserted, that
‘knowledge of all sorts is thoroughly enmeshed in the clash of petty
dominations, as well as in the larger battles which constitute our world’.30
The petty (only in so far as it is but one instance of many) domination of a
marginal group carried out by the generation of bureaucratic knowledge as
part of a management of need might be seen, with reference to Barry Allen
and his mentor Ivan Illich, as an endemic counterproductivity; a condition
which restricts the generation of real knowledge31 and which, in agreement
with Foucault, reveals much about the constitution of our administered
culture. This latter prospect is increasingly likely if the vantage point of
exterior insight shifts further to regard the AHRB and RAE as not central
bureaux, but merely peripheral agents of a much grander insidious
instrumentalisation-of-everything in a general economy.
In preparing the way for his analysis of the ways in which managed
need is crucial to the successful petty domination of a marginal group,
Barry Allen explains his take on Foucault’s combination of
power/knowledge:
The point of speaking of power/knowledge is not to say that knowledge is
power, or that there is nothing more to knowledge than service to power, or
anything of the sort. The point is to emphasize the reciprocity which obtains
between those specific forms of knowledge which ‘discipline’ makes possible
and the exercise of disciplinary power over conduct, an exercise of power which
is extended and refined through the further growth of that knowledge.32
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In discussing need in these terms Allen homes in on ‘the professional,
disciplinary power/knowledge of those who impute needs to others for
whom they alone have the right to prescribe’, logically going on to
connect disciplinary power/knowledge and governmental politics:
Secure in a discipline’s self-certified rationality and epistemological warrant,
accredited experts typically receive the presumption of others (bureaucrats,
magistrates, police, primary teachers, and so on) with whom they share some
interest in the political governance of conduct. Such knowledge can be and
routinely is an instrument for political effects of government, especially through
the strategy of imputed needs.33
Knowledge-as-instrument is recognisable in the operations of the AHRB
and RAE, for national standardising is indeed approached through the
management of need (that of agents’ and antagonists’) and not through an
authoritative settling of the criteria proposed by McArthur and his like –
nor for that matter through an essential exposition of the intellectual basis
of any fundamental abstract criteria of audit: knowledge is formed instead
into units of instrumental technical expertise and is necessarily displaced
from fluid discursive practices of knowledge generation.
This difference is demonstrated by the fact that the AHRB’s
Response to Consultation is less aggressive towards the philosophical
validity of research by creative visual artwork than McArthur’s
antagonism would suggest, for the paper is careful to set out what
constitutes research with reference only to what the AHRB as an auditing
organisation needs for audit – thus, by imputation, what the creative
artwork practitioner needs as an adjunct to her studio production. This may
seem like a tautological point, but the operative sleight of hand sees the list
of essential argumentation against creative artwork as research in-itself
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slipped from the discursive table, to be substituted with a similar-in-form
list of the agent’s technical needs. Stylistically the AHRB’s document
performs that ruse in this way: stating, promisingly, that ‘[t]he first
requirement of any set of criteria for the assessment of research is that they
should articulate clearly what constitutes research’, the authors follow
immediately with, instrumentally, ‘[s]ince 1999, the AHRB has required
all applicants for research funding to specify clearly…’34, and then go on
to list the four requirements which are needed by the AHRB before
research submitted to them can be considered as such.35 The dislocation of
the heralded but missing explanation of what actually constitutes research
from the subsequently present pragmatic explanation of auditors’ needs
encapsulates the structure of the antagonism at work here and sets in train
the practical management of the audit through the necessary dissemination
of those tabulated needs. The bureau’s goal, then, is to so efficiently
disseminate knowledge of its needs that that accumulation of new
functional information takes the place of primary criteria and becomes the
imputed need of all individuals institutionally engaged in the final
reckoning.
Imputed need is for Allen, ‘needing stimulated by another who
imputes a need or identifies and prescribes for a personal deficiency’.36
With substantive analysis of criteria having being replaced by a checklist
of auditors’ needs - which serves from the moment of its announcement to
suppress, in Barkun’s extended sense of the term, any unaccountable
knowledge garnered by those practitioners of research by creative artwork
- it could be argued that there is a classic, ‘Enlightened’ bureaucratic turn
from the vicissitudes of actuality to the rationality of practicality. Allen
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engages this complex discourse with reference to the domination of
individual needs by the authority of the mission of the 1st century church
meted out by its evangelical peripheral agents.
At a time when a filigree network of clientage linked the men who governed the
far-flung cities of the late Roman empire, Christians translated people’s real
need for patrons and friends into an imputed need for an invisible power, as in
the cult of saints, the theology of sacraments, and pastoral care.37
The proto-Christian turns his attention away from actual need to embrace
his version of a collective need for pastoral care and salvation. This social
model of an invisible power compelling agents to perform pastoral
kindness in its name in return for a shared and resigned understanding
amongst lowly citizens of the collective lot, creates a curious (and now
familiar) power/knowledge dynamic, as Allen explains:
Those who are drawn into a pastoral or caring relationship thus enter into a
peculiar relationship of power: putatively salvific, continuous and coextensive
with life, simultaneously individualizing and totalizing, linked to the production
of knowledge of individuals which is cultivated for the sake of comprehensive
social government, governing all by governing each one.38
Such a system of social governance requires the proliferation of experts
who can represent and distribute the necessary body of knowledge (and
gather it from individuals) required to support the seemingly redemptive
inculcation of the imputed sense of individual mortal deficiency. Citing
the inspirational work of Ivan Illich,39 Allen writes:
Wherever there is a profession there must be a clientele; wherever there is a
disciplinary profession otherwise free or indifferent potential clients become a
laity. What defines these new disciplinary professions is their effective
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presumption ‘to define a person as a client, to determine that person’s need, and
to hand the person a prescription.40
In the case of evaluative diagnoses, as it were, issued by the AHRB/RAE,
all need is predetermined by the standardised bullet-pointed prescription of
the type seen in the Response to Consultation. Individual researchers by
creative practice are invited to adopt given needs to ameliorate their
professional deficiencies so that, in time, their units of production might
be exchanged for money which will then be distributed by the central
authority to its peripheral agents in order to facilitate the next cycle of
information accumulation and audit. In this programme each individual
researcher is assimilated into larger congregations to assist the streamlined
compilation of information conducive to the ultimate audit, and, according
to bureaucratic logic, to ensure that no one individual is out with a
prescribed intellectual community (administrative net). As Allen’s
analogical example relates, self-governance according to imputed needs is
strictly encouraged by the resident or itinerant canonised expert so that the
submitted lay community might be collectively successful come
judgement day. The salvific element in the RAE is, of course, the divine
reward of income – which comes only to those clients who have dutifully
defined their achievements and needs with reference to the right
sacraments.
But this conventionally ethical behaviour of the community of
individuals (in the eyes of the arbitrating bureau) embodies what Allen
sees as the ‘disabling’ effects of too much knowledge. This time taking the
discipline of the health profession as model, he explains why the
Foucauldian accumulation of new objects of knowledge and information
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in the process of establishing authoritative power can, paradoxically, bring
about a crippling counterproductivity:
The pragmatist’s wish to secure a practical difference between real knowledge
and what is false, wrong, inappropriate, or otherwise unfit for the honor of
knowledge by reference to intelligent creativity in the resolution of problematic
situations comes to grief when the right to define better or worse passes from the
client to the disciplinary provider of care.41
Specifically, Allen sees with regret the petty domination of individuals by
an aleopathic authority that prescribes needs in advance of diagnoses, thus
removing, or at least terminally problematising, the right of the individual-
now-client to deviate from the carer’s authority. Too much knowledge is
counterproductive, indeed disabling (and likely by the design of authority-
stigmatisation), for it ensures as a necessary part of its genesis and
accumulation the marginalisation of any credible and incredible
alternative. Extending the medical model, Allen continues:
The disabling effects of knowledge include the production of counterpurposive
imputed needs, which transform differences into impairments and motivates
efforts to remake the bodies of those rich enough to demand professional care or
too poor to say no. Nonprofessional, vernacular care is discredited if not actually
made illegal, while the practical capacity and nondisciplinary knowledge
required for self-care is laid to waste’42
As Campbell and Barkun told us, such alternative thinking, all of which
will not be wrong, is ignored, rejected, suppressed and superseded by the
knowledge and information of the canonical authority. In the long term,
paradoxically, the alternative non-disciplinary, at least non-disciplined, in-
itself knowledge might be disestablished from the institution and sent to
seek pastoral care from Arts Councils and other bodies who privately
support the alternative medicine proposed by the creative visual arts.
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This exponential rise of the dominant authority is assisted by a
bureaucratic strategy related to the ruse contained within the AHRB’s
position paper. As Allen explains: ‘professional prescriptive knowledge
claims to be self-disciplining, which in practice makes it self-certifying,
leaving the discipline free to define the quality of its service in accordance
with its own practitioners’ satisfaction with the result’.43 The subject is
objectified by the knowledge of the professional discipline and, under very
real pressure as noted, performs to the imputed needs of the self-certifying
bureau. The practitioners in this instance are peripheral agents of authority,
all of whom have the standard-issue yardstick of income generation as a
means to measure institutional satisfaction with audit outcomes.
The salvific judgement which rules on the distribution of capital in
the aftermath of audit, compels individuals-now-groups to adhere to
imputed needs and thus mitigates, in theory, against Crozier’s prediction
of the displacement of goals within bureaucratic organisations. What with
this type of salvation at stake, the institution of art and design must
perpetually tend its given sacraments.
Overseen by peripheral agents, preparation for the periodic RAE
audit is ongoing within institutions, and makes certain of what Foucault
called with regard to the general auditing impulse of bureaucratic
disciplinary powers, the introduction of ‘individuality into the field of
documentation...[in an] age of infinite examination and of compulsory
objectification’.44 Practically speaking, like the RAE audit proper, this
ongoing micro-audit is de facto Foucault’s ‘examination’:
The examination leaves behind it a whole meticulous archive constituted in
terms of bodies and days. The examination that places individuals in a field of
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surveillance also situates them in a network of writing; it engages them in a
whole mass of documents that capture and fix them. The procedures of
examination were accompanied at the same time by a system of intense
registration and of documentary accumulation.45
Foucault was thinking expressly about the power/knowledge conditions in
18thC French schools, but drawing an essential point from that context he
concluded; ‘the examination enabled the teacher, while transmitting his
knowledge, to transform his pupils into a whole field of knowledge’.46 The
transmitted (imputed) needs of the audit bureau, and the didactic bureaux
which it consults, become, through their being diligently tended, a
professionalised body of knowledge which controls its subjects by
standardisation and examination. It is hereabouts that the preliminary
antipathy between the creative and the bureaucratic is at its most acute. In
addressing the fundamental purpose of the exam, Foucault indirectly but
definitively summarised the root cause of the AHRB/RAE’s need for
auxiliary explanatory materials, and thus the root cause of frustration
within the in-itself camp.
The examination is the technique by which power, instead of emitting the signs
of its potency, instead of imposing its mark on its subjects, holds them in a
mechanism of objectification. In this space of domination, disciplinary power
manifests its potency, essentially, by arranging objects. The examination is, as it
were, the ceremony of this objectification.47
For Foucault the examination is the primary practice of a disciplinary
power, and a logical culmination of what he termed, ‘hierarchical
observation’ and ‘normalizing judgement’.
In a now classic scenario, Foucault’s disciplinary power ensures
that subjects are objectified by mechanisms which permit perpetual seeing,
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so, for example; ‘architecture is no longer built simply to be seen, or to
observe the external space, but to permit an internal, articulated and
detailed control – to render visible those who are inside it.48 For us, the
digital architecture of the live institutional intranet keeps a disciplined eye
on subjects, and informs the building of the final panoptic database of the
bureau’s auditors.49
Under constant gaze, the institutionalised researcher is also subject
to ongoing instances of normalising judgement which are exercised when
it appears under observation that the rational organisation’s imputed needs
are not being adopted. The newly forming research hierarchy in schools of
art is a means by which these petty judgements can take effect and by
which individuals can subsequently be arranged: ‘discipline rewards
simply by the play of awards, thus making it possible to attain higher ranks
and places; it punishes by reversing this process.’50 Researchers compete
for recognition as such, with the prospect of teaching-only places awaiting
those who do not make the grade, or those who do not choose to take
sacrament. Within these procedures of objectification, the individual, if not
stripped of his actual need - as Allen might have seen in his model of
religious conversion - has his self-identified creative needs suppressed
through the objectifying processes of surveillance, penalty and
examination, to the detriment of his own subjective agency. Even the
collective esprit de corps of the members of the marginalised grouping is
cold comfort for the individual’s institutional stigmatisation.
IV CONCLUSION
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There persists, then, a deep-seated antagonism between the creative and
the bureaucratic in institutions of art which pressurises the in-itself
practitioner into a marginal position to be held there pending
stigmatisation by a sustained power/knowledge dynamic which manages
imputed need. Perhaps that is predictable, but hopefully the preceding
discussion offered new outlooks on that antagonism and, thus, on the ways
in which the in-itself position is thrown in(to) discourse. That said, there
remains something unsatisfactory about all this.
As was hinted in the opening section, Foucauldian critique
necessarily holds itself away from judgements about the essential
contested tenets held by those groups implicated in a mutually sustaining
power/knowledge dynamic. It might be fair to say that this essay with its
Foucauldian pretences is consequently guilty of the Foucauldian
evasiveness as enunciated by Rorty and, therefore, guilty also of a general
bureaucratic sleight of hand more familiar to the machinations of the
managerial auditor. As interesting as such an essay may or may not be as
an in-house exercise in critical theory, its bureaucratic conceit is the turn
towards the manner of the systematisation of the discourse at the expense
of what it contains.
This puzzle, which is not innocuous, is lucidly summarised by
sociologist Tim Dant, and that summary might help construct an endpoint
for this essay. Echoing Barry Allen’s position on disabling knowledge,
Dant makes reference to Adorno’s thoughts on the objectification of the
human subject by bodies of conventional knowledge, and expresses an
opinion which is usefully supportive of the in-itself agenda:
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What the positivist, uncritical, human sciences do is ignore the capacity of a
society to know itself (and indeed act on that knowledge), and treat it as a mere
object to be observed. Adorno accepts that the human individual can be treated
as an object (by biological science, by medicine), but the subject of society is
irreducible to the status of an object. It is the very thing that generates the
knowledge of itself, and no methodology can take up a position outside of
society and its lived relations to study it ‘objectively’. A positivist methodology
removes - or, at least, puts aside – the questions of value, of struggle, of how the
world ought to be or could be.51
By default, a managerial bureaucratic methodology, one which exercises
its ongoing surveillance in pursuit of standardisation and which relies on
the broadest inculcation of imputed need, has to put aside, to marginalise,
those practices of knowledge which cannot be expediently measured. The
positivist impulse behind the power/knowledge dynamic of audit is here to
stay, but, following McArthur’s under-the-net antagonism, taking a lead
from Dent, and acknowledging again the likely instrumentality of this
essay, the debate might best return to address the subject driven lived
relations of the production of creative visual artwork, and the knowledge
thereby generated.
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